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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 16, 2010, the governor of Nevada, facing one of the worst
economic crises in the State’s history, signed a proclamation convening the
state legislature into a special session to reduce state government spending.1
As is his constitutional prerogative, Governor Jim Gibbons chose which areas
the legislature should look to in making budget cuts during the 2010 Special
Session.2  Among them were the removal of all but the most essential spending
earmarks for K-12 education in the state3 and revisions of statutory language
mandating the reduction of teacher-pupil ratios.4  The result was a 6.9 percent
reduction of state funding for K-12 education5 and an increase in elementary-
grade class sizes.6
This budget cut was merely the latest blow by the Nevada legislature to
the quality of education in Nevada.  Over the past decade, the legislature has
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, William S. Boyd School of Law; B.S. Vanderbilt University.
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their time and resources to make this Note possible.  Special thanks to the Nevada Law
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1 STATE OF NEV. EXEC. DEP’T, A PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNOR (Feb. 16, 2010), avail-
able at http://leg.state.nv.us/26th2010Special/Governor/Proclamation.pdf.
2 See NEV. CONST. art. V, § 9 (“The Governor may on extraordinary occasions, convene the
Legislature by Proclamation and shall state to both houses when organized, the purpose for
which they have been convened, and the Legislature shall transact no legislative business,
except that for which they were specially convened, or such other legislative business as the
Governor may call to the attention of the Legislature while in Session.”).
3 STATE OF NEV. EXEC. DEP’T, supra note 1.
4 STATE OF NEV. EXEC. DEP’T, FIRST AMENDED PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNOR (Feb.
24, 2010), available at http://leg.state.nv.us/26th2010Special/Governor/ProclamationSpecial
Session2010Amend1.pdf.
5 David McGrath Schwartz & Cy Ryan, Budget Gets OK as Session Ends; Sales Tax
Extended for Roads, LAS VEGAS SUN (Mar. 1, 2010, 6:45 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.
com/news/2010/feb/28/governor-legislators-announce-budget-cut-agreement/.
6 CLARK CNTY. SCH. DIST., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL BUDGET REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR
ENDING JUNE 30, 2011, at 16 (2010), available at http://ccsd.net/directory/budget-finance/
publications/10-11_Budget/Budget_10-11_Complete.pdf.
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slashed the education budget,7 increased class sizes,8 eliminated funds to reme-
diate troubled schools,9 and done away with innovative educational reform.10
In fact, before the 2010 Special Session decreased school funding and increased
class sizes, Nevada already ranked forty-fifth in per-pupil expenditures11 and
maintained the fifth-highest student-teacher ratio in the nation.12  Such statis-
tics have led to an unfortunately commonplace expression: when it comes to
education Nevada finds itself at the bottom of every good list and the top of
every bad list.13
The educational provision, Article 11, of the Nevada Constitution man-
dates, in part, that “[t]he legislature shall provide for a uniform system of com-
mon schools”14 and, furthermore, that “[t]he legislature shall encourage by all
suitable means the promotion of intellectual, literary, scientific, mining,
mechanical, agricultural, and moral improvements . . . .”15  Yet, despite these
constitutional mandates, Nevada continues to rank well below the national
averages in terms of student achievement and academic funding.16  In light of
such disappointing statistics, continued budget cuts, and a lack of education
reform in Nevada, one might wonder whether the legislature has abdicated its
constitutional responsibility under Article 11, and, if so, whether a remedy
exists.
7 Brendan Riley, Outlook for State Budget Remains Gloomy, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Mar. 20,
2008, at 2B, available at http://www.lvrj.com/news/16846541.html (“The 4.5 percent budget
cuts already in effect hit the state’s K-12 schools and its human services programs the hard-
est.  The K-12 system has had to deal with cuts of nearly $93 million, and the Department of
Health and Human Services is cutting $82 million.”).
8 Emily Richmond, Education Cuts May Never Be Healed, LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 2, 2010,
at 1, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/mar/02/education-cuts-may-
never-be-healed/.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 LAS VEGAS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EDUCATION BRIEFING SERIES: FACTORS CORRELA-
TIVE WITH EDUCATION ATTAINMENT 20 (2010), available at http://www.lvchamber.com/
files/pdf/lvcc-edbrief-series-1-2.pdf.
12 Id. at 21.
13 See, e.g., Alexandra Berzon, Nevada in a Budget Squeeze, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2010, at
A3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703791504575079391267
764362.html (“Democratic lawmakers often blame the low spending for the state’s ranking
on what they call the bottom of all the good lists and the top of all the bad lists. Nevada has
among the highest number of uninsured children and suicide rates and among the lowest
reading scores and college degrees per capita.”); Dina Titus, Nevada Senator, Address at the
4th Annual Clark County Education Association (May 5, 2007) (transcript available at http://
www.ccea-nv.org/index.php/recent-articles/436-senator-dina-titus-addresses-group.html)
(“If we do not make education a real priority, Nevada will never get off the bottom of every
good list and the top of every bad list”); Dan Klaich, Building a New Nevada: How the
College of Southern Nevada Is Using Partnerships to Build a Better Community, NEV. SYS.
HIGHER EDUC., http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs030/1100950573924/archive/1102824
459206.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) (“It is no secret that Nevada has been at the bottom
of every ‘good’ list and the top of every ‘bad’ list when it comes to quality of life and
education.”).
14 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
15 Id. § 1.
16 See infra Part IV.A.
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Since the 1970s, education plaintiffs across the country have taken their
claims to state courts, challenging the inequities and inadequacies of their edu-
cational systems under their respective state constitutions.17  Surprisingly,
Nevada remains one of only five states in the nation not to have encountered
such a lawsuit.18  This Note explores the potential for litigants, on behalf of
Nevada schoolchildren, to take to the courts and force the legislature’s reluctant
hand into complying with the Nevada Constitution and providing real reform in
the State’s educational financing and structure.
In exploring this approach to education reform, Part II provides a brief
history of school finance litigation and the various legal strategies used to
attack the constitutionality of school financing systems.  Part III engages in a
comparative analysis of successful education reform litigation in sister states,
providing model approaches to litigation and jurisprudential analysis.  Part IV
sets forth the constitutional and factual bases for challenging the Nevada sys-
tem of financing public education as inadequate, and concludes with a brief
discussion of defining an “adequate” education.  Finally, Part V takes on criti-
cisms often leveled at education reform lawsuits and assuages separation of
powers concerns.  The Note concludes that there is ample evidence and a suffi-
cient constitutional basis for challenging the current system for financing public
education in Nevada.
II. HISTORY OF EDUCATION REFORM LITIGATION
A. Federal Courts and Education Reform Litigation
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments.  Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic
society.  It is required in the performance of our most basic responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces.  It is the very foundation of good citizenship.  Today it is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for
later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of education.  Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.19
In this oft-quoted “encomium to education,”20 first enunciated in Brown v.
Board of Education, the United States Supreme Court underscored the vital
role of public education in American life.  The immediate objective behind
17 Christine M. O’Neill, Note, Closing the Door on Positive Rights: State Court Use of the
Political Question Doctrine to Deny Access to Educational Adequacy Claims, 42 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 545, 545-46 (2009).
18 NAT’L ACCESS NETWORK, LITIGATIONS CHALLENGING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF K-12
FUNDING IN THE 50 STATES 1 (2010), available at http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/
New_Charts/06_2010_lit_chall_constitutionality.pdf.  Delaware, Hawaii, Mississippi,
Nevada, and Utah are the only five states in the nation that have never faced litigation chal-
lenging the constitutionality of their respective education systems.
19 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
20 Brief for Appellees at 26, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 U.S. 1 (1973)
(No. 71-1332).
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Brown, of course, was to confront the educational inequities caused by racial
segregation in public schools, which the Court ultimately held violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.21  However, many
activists saw in the above language the potential to constitutionally secure
equal educational opportunities for students of diverse socioeconomic, linguis-
tic, and geographic backgrounds, as well.22
Despite Brown’s great promise, attempts to desegregate America’s public
schools in the following decade saw few gains.23  In lieu of racial segregation,
state education-funding schemes relying largely on local property taxes led to
unequal education opportunities based on geographic location.24  As minority
populations relocated to the inner cities and the white population took flight to
the suburbs, cities’ tax bases and property values correspondingly decreased.25
The use of local property taxes to fund education consequently provided these
property-rich, predominately white suburbs with significantly more money for
schools than the city school districts and their mostly minority student bodies.26
To combat these vestiges of segregation and past discrimination, litigants took
to the courts and challenged inter-district school funding disparities under the
federal Equal Protection Clause.
By the 1970s, the Court had developed a three-tiered framework of judi-
cial scrutiny for evaluating equal protection challenges to legislation.27  First,
where the law in question burdens a suspect class or interferes with the exercise
of fundamental rights and liberties explicitly or implicitly protected by the U.S.
Constitution, strict scrutiny applies.28  Strict scrutiny is the most exacting form
of judicial review, and the statute will only be upheld if the state can show that
the legislation is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest.29  Second,
where the statute draws distinctions based on certain classifications that the
Court has declared “quasi-suspect,” such as gender30 or illegitimacy,31 an inter-
mediate level of scrutiny applies.32  Under intermediate scrutiny, the statute
will be upheld if the government can demonstrate that the classification “sub-
stantially furthers an important government interest.”33  All other laws chal-
21 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
22 Recent Cases, School Finance—North Carolina Supreme Court Finds the State in Viola-
tion of Its Constitution for Failing to Provide Students an Opportunity to Obtain a Sound
Basic Education.—Hoke County Board of Education v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365 (N.C. 2004),
118 HARV. L. REV. 1753, 1753 (2005); see also Kate Strickland, The School Finance Reform
Movement, A History and Prognosis: Will Massachusetts Join the Third Wave of Reform?,
32 B.C. L. REV. 1105, 1118 (1991).
23 Strickland, supra note 22, at 1118.
24 Id. at 1119.
25 Id. at 1120.
26 Id.
27 Roger Craig Green, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study of Judicial Tech-
nique, 108 YALE L.J. 439, 439 (1998).
28 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (racial classifications); Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969) (right to vote).
29 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
30 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
31 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
32 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
33 Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 460 (1981).
Summer 2011] EDUCATIONAL REFORM LITIGATION 853
lenged on equal protection grounds are subject to rational basis review, the
most deferential form of judicial scrutiny, requiring only that a law rationally
relate to a legitimate government interest.34
By arguing that education is an implied fundamental right and that the
poor are a suspect class, plaintiffs in federal finance-reform cases sought strict
judicial scrutiny of state education-funding schemes reliant on local wealth.35
Following some success in lower courts, the early 1970s witnessed a ground-
swell of state and federal court cases challenging the constitutionality of such
funding methods.36  Given the number of school finance cases percolating up
through the judicial system, it seemed only a matter of time before the Supreme
Court would review a school finance case.37  Then, in 1973, the Court consid-
ered a lower court decision from Texas declaring the state’s system of financ-
ing schools unconstitutional.38  The ensuing five-to-four opinion in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez reversed the lower court’s
decision, and effectively closed the door of the federal courthouse to school
finance challenges based on the federal equal protection clause.39
In Rodriguez, Mexican-American parents of schoolchildren residing in
districts with a low property tax base brought a class-action suit attacking the
Texas school financing system.40  At the time of the suit, local property taxes
accounted for nearly half of school revenues in Texas, creating dramatic ine-
qualities in public funding between school districts.41  To highlight these dis-
parities, the plaintiffs drew a comparison between Texas’s least- and most-
affluent school districts.42  Alamo Heights, with its predominantly white stu-
dent body population, had an assessed property value more than eight times
that of Edgewood, a district with a student population that was approximately
90 percent Mexican-American and 6 percent African-American.43  As a result,
public schools in Alamo Heights received nearly double the per-pupil funding
that schools in the Edgewood district received.44  In light of these disparities,
Texas virtually conceded its financing system could not withstand strict judicial
scrutiny.45  The issue, therefore, was whether the Texas system of financing
public education was subject to strict judicial scrutiny, either because it oper-
ated to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinged on a fundamental
right.46  In its analysis, however, the Court found neither the suspect-classifica-
34 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996); City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
35 Lauren Nicole Gillespie, Note, The Fourth Wave of Education Finance Litigation: Pursu-
ing a Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 991 (2010).
36 See, e.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, (D. Minn. 1971); Serrano v. Priest
(Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972);
Robinson v. Cahill, 289 A.2d 569 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972); Spano v. Bd. of Educ.,
68 Misc. 2d 804 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972).
37 Strickland, supra note 22, at 1128.
38 Id.
39 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
40 Id. at 4-5.
41 Id. at 9 n.21.
42 Id. at 11.
43 Id. at 12-13.
44 Id. at 13.
45 Id. at 16.
46 Id. at 17.
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tion nor the fundamental-interest analyses compelling, and held that the rational
basis test was the proper standard by which to examine the school-funding
scheme.47
The Court first rejected the argument that the Texas school-financing plan
discriminates against the poor on the basis of wealth as a “suspect category.”
Reviewing precedent, the Court noted two distinguishing characteristics shared
by individuals fairly classified as “indigent” for purposes of suspect classifica-
tion analysis: (1) they were completely unable to pay for some benefit, and (2)
as a result, they sustained an absolute deprivation of that benefit.48  The plain-
tiffs in Rodriguez, however, possessed neither of these characteristics.49 First,
“poor” school districts are not strictly composed of persons whose incomes fall
below some designated poverty level or who are in any way fairly definable as
indigent.50  Second, the students in such districts were not absolutely deprived
of education.51  The Court therefore refused “to extend its most exacting scru-
tiny to review a system that allegedly discriminates against a large, diverse, and
amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in districts
that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts.”52
The Court also rejected the argument that education was a fundamental
right under the federal constitution.  The Court determined that the key to dis-
covering whether education is fundamental “lies in assessing whether there is a
right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”53
Noting that education is not among those rights explicitly protected by the U.S.
Constitution, the Court’s decision turned to whether education was an implic-
itly protected right.54  While recognizing the societal significance of education
as a font from which other fundamental rights emanate,55 the court nevertheless
found such arguments unpersuasive in establishing education as an implied fun-
damental right.56  Because the challenged legislation in Rodriguez neither cre-
ated a suspect classification nor impinged upon constitutionally protected
rights, the Court held that the Texas system of public school finance was an
inappropriate candidate for strict judicial scrutiny.57
Reinforcing this conclusion, the Court expressed a number of reservations
over its own involvement in school finance litigation.58  In particular, the Court
pointed to federalism concerns over interfering with States’ fiscal and educa-
47 Id. at 18.
48 Id. at 20.
49 Id. at 22.
50 Id. at 22-23.
51 Id. at 23.
52 Id. at 28.
53 Id. at 33.
54 Id. at 35.
55 See, e.g., id. at 35-36 (asserting that education is essential to the exercise of free speech,
as the right becomes “meaningless unless the speaker is capable of articulating his thoughts
intelligently and persuasively,” and similarly, to the right to vote, which “depends on an
informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and
thought processes have been adequately developed”).
56 Id. at 37.
57 Id. at 44.
58 See id. at 40-44.
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tional policies.59  The Court traditionally deferred such matters to local legisla-
tures because the Justices lacked the specialized knowledge necessary to make
informed judgments.60  Accordingly, the Court examined the Texas system
under the less-stringent “rational basis” test, and concluded the financing
scheme was constitutional.61  Thus, so long as the state’s school-financing sys-
tem “rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest,”62 Texas—and
every other state in the country, for that matter—could maintain a school-
financing system that leads to funding inequities between schools, and still
comply with the demands of the U.S. Constitution.63
Despite the blow suffered in Rodriguez, proponents of education reform
litigation took solace in the dissent’s final footnote, in which Justice Thurgood
Marshall observed that “nothing in the Court’s decision today should inhibit
further review of state educational funding schemes under state constitutional
provisions.”64  Acting on this cue, finance-reform litigants took to the state
courts and argued against school funding inequalities based on their state con-
stitutional provisions.65  And so, with Rodriguez effectively closing the door on
a federally mandated fundamental right to education, the impetus behind educa-
tion finance litigation shifted from the federal forum to state courts.
B. State Courts and Education Reform Litigation: Equity or Adequacy?
In the aftermath of Rodriguez, proponents of school finance reform began
challenging state funding structures that disadvantaged racial and socioeco-
nomic minorities under the equal protection guarantees and educational provi-
sions found in state constitutions.66  The state court approach auspiciously
addressed many of the concerns plaguing the Rodriguez majority.  First, unlike
the federal constitution, state constitutions explicitly guarantee a right to educa-
tion.67  Second, fewer federalism concerns exist where state courts meddle with
state fiscal and educational policies governed by state constitutions.68  Third,
state court judges possess a greater “expertise and familiarity with local
59 Id. at 40.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 55.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 132-33 n.100 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65 Larry J. Onhof, Rethinking Judicial Activism and Restraint in State School Finance Liti-
gation, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 577 (2004).
66 Sonja R. Elder, Note, Standing Up to Legislative Bullies: Separation of Powers, State
Courts, and Educational Rights, 57 DUKE L.J. 755, 756 (2007).  For further justification of
state courts’ ability to recognize education as a fundamental right, see discussion infra Part
III.A.
67 Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 311 (1991); see, e.g., NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
68 See Andrea J. Faraone, The Florida Equal Rights Amendment: Raising the Standard
Applied to Gender Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution, 1 FLA.
COASTAL L.J. 421, 429 (citing Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla. 1992)); see also
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
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problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions,”69 which federal court
judges and Justices of the United States Supreme Court lack.70
The litigation approach in state courts has taken on two distinct, yet inter-
related, forms: (1) the equity approach, which focuses on equalizing per-pupil
funding disparities, and was prominent from 1973 through 1989;71 and (2) the
adequacy approach, which focuses on overall sufficiency of funds and educa-
tional opportunities, and has been the preferred litigation approach ever since
1989.72  These approaches, outlined below, differ with respect to legal theories,
methods of judicial analysis, plaintiff success rates, and the degree of substan-
tial education reform that results from successful litigation73
1. The Equity Approach
The litigation strategies of the early state cases challenging education-
funding schemes largely mimicked their federal counterparts.74  Most state
constitutions, including Nevada’s,75 contain equal protection provisions, or
some similar equality guarantee, which courts have interpreted to be substan-
tively equivalent to the federal equal protection clause.76  Under the “equity”
approach, plaintiffs sought strict judicial scrutiny of school funding schemes,
once again arguing that education constituted a fundamental right, or, alterna-
tively, that school district poverty constituted a suspect class.77  Added to their
arsenal, however, were the education provisions of state constitutions, which
69 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 41.
70 Faraone, supra note 68, at 429-30 (“[S]tate courts have a greater ability to assess local
conditions and to respond to the unique needs of their own state.”).
71 William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance Litigation:
The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 601 (1994) [hereinafter Thro,
Third Wave].
72 See Alexandra Natapoff, 1993: The Year of Living Dangerously; State Courts Expand the
Right to Education, 92 EDUC. L. REP. 755, 757 (1994); see also William E. Thro, A New
Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL. 525,
538-39 (1998) [hereinafter Thro, A New Approach]; Thro, Third Wave, supra note 71, at
601.  Thro actually reasons that challenges to the school finance systems of the various states
can be divided into three distinct “waves” with their own identifiable set of characteristics
with respect to legal theory, judicial analyses, and plaintiff success rate.  The first “wave”—
litigation arising under the federal Equal Protection Clause—died with Rodriguez. But see
William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-examination of
the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1185, 1188 (2003) (noting that “courts have fused their equity and adequacy analysis”
and that it is often difficult to distinguish between the second- and third-wave cases
effectively).
73 Thor, Third Wave, supra note 71, at 598-99.
74 Natapoff, supra note 72, at 757.
75 NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 21.
76 Richard J. Stark, Education Reform: Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutions’ Edu-
cation Finance Provisions—Adequacy vs. Equality, 1991 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 609, 626-27.
Nevada is included amongst states adopting the federal Equal Protection analysis. See
Laakonen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 538 P.2d 574, 575-76 (Nev. 1975); see also
Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175, 182 (Nev. 2001) (“This court’s standard for
examining the validity of legislation under the Equal Protection Clause is the same as the
federal standard.  Thus, the proper standard of review depends on the classification to be
considered, and the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to the affected interest.”).
77 Gillespie, supra note 35, at 999.
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impose a duty upon the state to provide for public education and bolster the
argument for declaring education a fundamental right under state equal protec-
tion analysis.78
Although this litigation strategy initially produced some successful
results,79 its success was ultimately short-lived.80  In both the judicial and leg-
islative arenas, efforts to equalize educational opportunities proved daunting.
For instance, a number of state courts found inequities in inter-district school
funding acceptable under state equal protection analysis.81  Additionally, the
complexity and competing viewpoints of how best to establish equality invited
courts to depict the issue as a political question best suited for the legislative
branch.82  These same complexities also frustrated legislative efforts to imple-
ment judicial mandates for equality, which required vast amounts of up-to-date
empirical data to ensure equality in funding schemes.83
Adding fuel to the fire, certain sections of the populace—particularly the
wealthier and more politically powerful school districts—were resolved in their
resistance to any attempt to equalize inter-district funding.84  For instance,
wealthier districts strongly opposed legislative efforts to achieve equality that
required restricting resources in their districts in order to match funding levels
in less-affluent districts.85  Wealthier districts were similarly hostile to legisla-
tion requiring them to shoulder the financial burden of raising school funding
revenues in the poorer districts.86  In addition, wealthier districts feared that by
equalizing inter-district funding, they would lose their competitive edge in
attracting better teachers and their students would consequently lose their com-
petitive edge in attaining post-school opportunities.87
Opponents of school funding equality also focused on arguments beyond
preserving the privileges of the upper class.88  One prominent fear was the loss
of local control and the right to determine how to allocate resources within a
community.89  Another common concern, following a “slippery slope” logic,
was that an equal protection victory in school funding could extend to other
social programs or municipal services, eliminating local control over housing,
recreational facilities, or even trash collection.90  Combined, these challenges
often proved too difficult for plaintiffs to overcome.  Of the twenty-three states
that heard educational equality claims, plaintiffs prevailed in only seven.91
78 Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48
VAND. L. REV. 101, 107 (1995).
79 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Serrano v. Priest
(Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d. 273 (N.J. 1973).
80 Gillespie, supra note 35, at 1000.
81 Enrich, supra note 78, at 143-44.
82 Id. at 153-54.
83 Id. at 154.
84 Id. at 155-56.
85 Id. at 156.
86 Id. at 156-57.
87 Id. at 157-58.
88 Id. at 158-59.
89 See id. at 158-61.
90 See id. at 161; see also O’Neill, supra note 17, at 553.
91 See Thro, Third Wave, supra note 71, at 602-03 (“Although plaintiffs were able to prevail
in Arkansas, California, Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyo-
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This less than inspiring record forced proponents of school finance litigation to
change their strategy.92
2. The Adequacy Approach
Beginning in 1989 with plaintiffs’ victories in Montana,93 Kentucky,94
and Texas,95 the adequacy approach has shown greater promise for achieving
education reform in the courtroom.96  Grounded in the state constitution educa-
tion clauses, the adequacy argument derived strength in its simplicity.  Rather
than navigating the doctrinal labyrinth of equal protection analysis, the ade-
quacy approach relies on an interpretation of the positive text set forth in the
education clauses of state constitutions.97  Instead of placing a remedial focus
on per-pupil spending disparities, the adequacy approach looks at the quality of
the educational services delivered to disadvantaged districts and aims to ensure
those services meet a constitutionally prescribed level of adequacy.98
The adequacy approach addressed many of the underlying concerns of the
equity approach without falling victim to the legal arguments and political
resistance that plagued inter-district funding equality.99 Specifically, three fun-
damental differences, described in greater detail below, give the adequacy
approach a distinct advantage:100 (1) the adequacy arguments are based upon
explicit textual sources in state constitutions; (2) the adequacy remedy allows
for local control of public education, making it more politically palatable; and
(3) under adequacy claims, courts have shown a propensity to both prescribe
overarching goals and take a stronger role in state education finance reform.101
Because adequacy claims rely almost exclusively on the education clauses
of state constitutions, adequacy litigation takes on a more narrowed constitu-
tional focus.102  As a result, courts need only appeal to the positive text of the
state constitutions to interpret and enforce an affirmative right to education.103
In comparison, the equal protection analysis employed by the equity approach
ming, the overwhelming majority of the cases resulted in victories for the state.” (footnotes
omitted)).
92 O’Neill, supra note 17, at 553.
93 Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 690 (Mont. 1989).
94 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 213 (Ky. 1989).
95 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989).
96 See MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA R. WOLFF, LITIGATION AND EDUCATION REFORM:
THE HISTORY AND THE PROMISE OF THE EDUCATION ADEQUACY MOVEMENT 8 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.schoolfunding.info/resource_center/adequacy-history.pdf (“In the early
years, most of these [education reform] cases sought equal per-pupil funding (‘equity’), but
state defendants won about two-thirds of those cases.  Since 1989, however, education advo-
cates and lawyers have emphasized a different legal theory—known as ‘education ade-
quacy’—that has led to a dramatic wave of plaintiff victories. . . .  Over the past 16 years,
plaintiffs have won in 21 of the 28 highest state court ‘adequacy’ cases.”).
97 See Enrich, supra note 78, at 167.
98 William E. Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance
Litigation, 79 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 21 (1993) [hereinafter Thro, The Role of Language].
99 Quentin A. Palfrey, The State Judiciary’s Role in Fulfilling Brown’s Promise, 8 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 1, 3 (2002).
100 Thro, Third Wave, supra note 71, at 603.
101 Id. at 603-04.
102 Id.
103 Enrich, supra note 78, at 166.
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requires that the courts take an intermediate interpretive step of determining
whether education is a fundamental right or wealth a suspect category, before it
can establish a constitutional mandate to equal education.104  Moreover,
because the central focus of an adequacy suit is on state constitution education
provisions, a ruling in favor of the plaintiff has fewer implications in other
areas of the law.105  By not implicating the equal protection doctrine, adequacy
plaintiffs avoid the “slippery slope” argument that equal protection could
extend to other local or state programs, such as housing or healthcare.106
By providing for a greater degree of local control, adequacy challenges
eliminate much of the political backlash faced by the equality approach.107
Instead of mandating equal expenditures for every district, adequacy plaintiffs
only seek to inject resources into schools that are not providing for a constitu-
tionally mandated level of quality education.108  Thus, because an adequacy
remedy will not reduce funding or cap spending in wealthier districts, these
districts are free to provide for a more-than-adequate education for their stu-
dents by spending more local tax dollars.109  By focusing only on those districts
that do not provide the constitutionally adequate standard of education, the ade-
quacy approach achieves education reform without requiring the far-reaching
demands necessary to equalize funding across all school districts in the state.110
Adequacy suits also allow for a more sweeping approach to reform
accompanied by continued court supervision.111  Whereas equity-based reme-
dies seek only to equalize the economic inputs of inter-district funding, ade-
quacy-based remedies focus on both economic inputs and academic outputs of
student achievement in determining whether the education provided is “ade-
quate.”112  Thus, under the adequacy approach, courts develop broad
frameworks by which the state legislature can either implement new, or modify
104 Id. at 167.
105 Thro, Third Wave, supra note 71, at 603.
106 See supra Part II.B.2; see also O’Neill, supra note 17, at 553 (“An equal protection
victory for plaintiffs in schools could be extended to other social programs, such as housing
or healthcare.  On the other hand, an adequacy claim based on an affirmative constitutional
right cannot be replicated for other social issues (i.e., there is no right to housing or to
healthcare in state constitutions though there is a right to education for all).”).
107 Gillespie, supra note 35, at 1005.
108 Palfrey, supra note 99, at 22; see also Thro, Third Wave, supra note 71, at 603.
109 Gillespie, supra note 35, at 1005.
110 See Enrich, supra note 78, at 166.
111 Thro, Third Wave, supra note 71, at 604.
112 William H. Clune, Educational Adequacy: A Theory and Its Remedies, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 481, 485 (1995) (“At its heart, adequacy refers to a shift in the emphasis of school
finance from inputs to outcomes, e.g. from dollars to student achievement as measured by
standardized tests and avoidance of dropping out.”); see also McUsic, supra note 67, at 310
(“Output measures are preferable currency units for litigants because they sidestep the need
to prove that more money produces more education.  Output measures are also valuable
because a dollar cannot always buy the same amount of education in one district as it can in
another.  Thus the use of output measures protects students from being guaranteed an ‘equal
or minimum education’ that meets the standard in terms of dollars spent, but not in education
received.  Output measures also excuse the courts from the role of educators or legislators.
Courts need only order a certain minimum standard without having to step outside their
expertise to dictate how that standard must be attained.”).
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current, education policy to achieve adequacy in schools.113  The adequacy
method, therefore, has allowed both state legislatures and courts to take on a
holistic approach to reforming education quality.114
Despite their theoretical differences, however, the equity and adequacy
approaches are largely interrelated in practice.115  Indeed, advocating for either
approach in its purest form could prove highly problematic: for instance, a pure
equity approach can be satisfied by funding all schools at an equally inadequate
level; on the contrary, a pure adequacy approach without regard for equality
can rob the poorest students of the educational opportunities afforded the
wealthiest.116  Thus, the most successful education-finance reform cases have
been brought by plaintiffs using a “hybrid” approach, wherein evidence of both
inadequacy and funding disparities synergize to bolster claims of constitutional
deficiency.117  While the remedial focus remains on the quality of education in
each school district, equality still stands as one measurement in determining
adequacy.118
III. MODEL APPROACHES TAKEN IN SISTER STATES
Over the last four decades, forty-five states have faced education-funding
lawsuits, in one form or another, brought under their respective state constitu-
tions.119  Therefore, educational reform plaintiffs in Nevada stand to benefit
from these sister states by embracing the successes and avoiding the pitfalls of
past litigation.  Additionally, the Nevada courts have a multitude of judicial
analyses, constitutional interpretations, and remedial actions to look to in inter-
preting the education clause of the Nevada Constitution.
A. Equity Suits: California’s Serrano v. Priest and Education as a
Fundamental Right
Serrano v. Priest120 was the nation’s first state-court equity case.121
There, the California Supreme Court held that education was a fundamental
right under the California Constitution,122 and, accordingly, applied strict scru-
tiny to overturn the state’s property-tax-based education funding scheme.123
Although the equity approach has fallen out of favor, a detailed analysis of the
113 Erin E. Buzuvis, Note, “A” for Effort: Evaluating Recent State Education Reform in
Response to Judicial Demands for Equity and Adequacy, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 670
(2001).
114 Gillespie, supra note 35, at 1005-06.
115 See Koski, supra note 72, at 1188 (arguing that “courts have fused their equity and
adequacy analyses,” blurring the supposed demarcation between equity cases and adequacy
cases).
116 Natapoff, supra note 72, at 779.
117 Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of State Constitu-
tions, 1997 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 1, 27 (1997); see also Buzuvis, supra note 113, at 656-57.
118 Natapoff, supra note 72, at 760.
119 NAT’L ACCESS NETWORK, supra note 18, at 1.
120 Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
121 Strickland, supra note 22, at 1125-26.
122 Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1258.
123 Id. at 1263.
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Serrano decision is included here for two reasons.  First, Serrano should serve
as a touchstone of jurisprudence for the Nevada courts in determining whether
education is a fundamental right under the Nevada Constitution.  The Nevada
Supreme Court has recognized that when a constitutional provision is derived
from a sister state, it is presumably adopted with the construction given it by
the highest court of the sister state.124  Because the California Constitution
served as the basis for the Nevada Constitution125—including the education
provisions126—it is appropriate for Nevada courts to look to the Serrano deci-
sion in deciphering the education clause of the Nevada Constitution.  Second,
equity arguments are still important to adequacy suits,127 and establishing edu-
cation as a fundamental right under the state constitution should bolster the
argument for a quality standard that requires more adequately funded
schools.128
In determining whether education is a fundamental right under the Califor-
nia Constitution, the Serrano court began by examining the “indispensible role
which education plays in the modern industrial state.”129  In this examination,
the court first reviewed dicta from United State Supreme Court cases that rec-
ognized the significance of education.130  The court then repeated the exercise,
this time reviewing its own opinions that discussed education’s importance to
both society as a whole and the individual citizen.131  Moreover, the court com-
pared education to other recognized fundamental rights, noting that education
had “far greater social significance” than, for example, the right to a court-
appointed lawyer.132  Additionally, the court analogized voting and education,
observing how each is crucial to the preservation and functioning of democ-
racy.133  Finally, the court looked at the education clause of the California Con-
124 State ex rel. Harvey v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 32 P.3d 1263, 1269 (Nev. 2001).
125 See ELEANORE BUSHNELL & DON W. DRIGGS, THE NEVADA CONSTITUTION: ORIGIN AND
GROWTH 25-27 (6th ed. 1984).  During Nevada’s Second Constitutional Convention in 1864,
from which Nevada’s current constitution derives, a proposal to use the California Constitu-
tion as the base of discussion was rejected because the First Nevada Constitution was largely
derived from the California Constitution.  For more discussion of the Nevada Constitution,
see supra Part I.
126 Compare NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall encourage by all suitable
means the promotion of intellectual, literary, scientific, mining, mechanical, agricultural, and
moral improvements . . .”), and id. § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for a uniform system
of common schools, by which a school shall be established and maintained in each school
district at least six months in every year, . . . and the legislature may pass such laws as will
tend to secure a general attendance of the children in each school district upon said public
schools.”), with CAL. CONST. art. IX § 1 (“[T]he Legislature shall encourage by all suitable
means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”), and
id. § 5 (“The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free
school shall be kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year, after
the first year in which a school has been established.”).
127 See supra Part II.B.2.
128 Thro, A New Approach, supra note 72, at 543-44.
129 Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971).
130 Id. at 1256.
131 Id. at 1257.
132 Id. at 1257-58.
133 Id. at 1258.
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stitution and took note of the framers’ intention, recognizing that their language
“express[ed] the importance of education.”134
Upon concluding that “the distinctive and priceless function of education
in our society warrants, indeed compels, our treating it as a ‘fundamental inter-
est,’”135 the Serrano court provided a summary of the significance of educa-
tion to modern society and the responsibility entrusted to the government in
providing education to the youth.  First, education provides a gateway to main-
stream American society regardless of an individual’s disadvantaged back-
ground, and is thus essential to maintaining our free enterprise democracy.136
Second, in comparison to other social services provided by the state, such as
welfare or police services, every person benefits from the publicly provided
service of education.137  Third, unlike other government services, public educa-
tion is an intensive, prolonged interaction between the child and the state, often
lasting more than a decade.138  Fourth, education actively attempts to shape the
emotional and psychological development of children in a manner determined
solely by the state.139  Finally, the state’s compulsory attendance statutes both
recognize the importance of education and place a responsibility on the state to
maintain adequate schools for the students who are required to attend them.140
Because Nevada based its constitution’s educational provisions on Califor-
nia’s, and due to Nevada Supreme Court precedent giving great weight to the
California high court’s interpretations of adopted constitutional clauses, Ser-
rano should have significant implications for future education litigation in
Nevada.  The Serrano court’s interpretation of California’s education provi-
sions lays the groundwork for establishing education as a fundamental right
under the Nevada Constitution—worthy of equal protection considerations and
paramount to other governmental services provided by the state.  Even if the
Nevada judiciary fails to declare education a fundamental right, the jurispru-
dential weight of Serrano should aid potential education-reform plaintiffs in
advancing the adequacy argument that the educational provisions of the Nevada
Constitution demand some greater level of quality in education than is already
being provided.
B. Adequacy Suits: Model Approaches of Sister States
1. Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.
Just as Serrano was the seminal case in the equality approach to educa-
tion-finance litigation, scholars view the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision in
Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.141 as the turning point in which
134 Id.
135 Id. (citation omitted).
136 Id. at 1258-59.
137 Id. at 1259.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. (noting that “a child of the poor assigned will-nilly to an inferior state school takes
on the complexion of a prisoner, complete with a minimum sentence of 12 years.”) (quoting
John E. Coons et al., Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State
Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 388 (1969)).
141 Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
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school finance suits moved to a focus on adequacy.142  The education reform
legislation that arose out of the Rose court’s holding produced promising
results, and many courts have since followed the lead set by the Kentucky
Supreme Court in response to adequacy suits.143
In Rose, plaintiffs from property-poor school districts in Kentucky filed a
class-action suit, claiming that the state education-finance system violated the
state constitution.144  In addressing the claim, the court held that education was
a fundamental right,145 and declared that at issue was whether the Kentucky
General Assembly had complied with its constitutional mandate to “provide an
efficient system of common schools throughout the state.”146  The court recog-
nized the “tidal wave” of evidence that showed Kentucky schools were
underfunded and inadequate: the state’s school system was ranked nationally in
the lower 20-25 percent in nearly every category used to evaluate educational
performance; 35 percent of the adult population were high school drop-outs;
the state ranked fortieth nationally in per-pupil expenditures and thirty-seventh
in teacher salary and compensation.147  Based on these factors, the court
declared Kentucky’s education funding scheme “constitutionally deficient,”
and constructed a remedy requiring a fundamental overhaul of the entire public
school system.148
The final decision was groundbreaking both for its breadth in declaring the
entire system of common schools in Kentucky constitutionally inadequate, and
for its specificity in providing guidelines for the Kentucky General Assembly
to follow in reestablishing this new school system.149  In defining an adequate
education, the Rose court enumerated seven learning goals, which have served
as a touchstone for other courts deciding similar cases:150
(i) sufficient oral and written communications skills to enable students to function in
a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic,
social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii)
sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to under-
stand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient
self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) suffi-
cient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and
historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in
either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue
life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient level of academic or vocational skills to
142 See, e.g., Clune, supra note 112, at 482; Preston C. Green & Bruce D. Baker, Circum-
venting Rodriguez: Can Plaintiffs Use the Equal Protection Clause to Challenge School
Finance Disparities Caused by Inequitable State Distribution Policies?, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. &
C.R. 141, 148 (2002); Aaron J. Saiger, Legislating Accountability: Standards, Sanctions, and
School District Reform, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1655, 1710 (2005); C. Scott Trimble &
Andrew C. Forsaith, Achieving Equity and Excellence in Kentucky Education, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 599, 605-09 (1995).
143 Palfrey, supra note 99, at 23.
144 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 190.
145 Id. at 206.
146 KY. CONST. § 183.
147 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 196-97.
148 Id. at 212.
149 Id. at 215.
150 Gillespie, supra note 35, at 1004.
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enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in sur-
rounding states, in academics or in the job market.151
While the Kentucky Supreme Court noted that it made its decision only on the
grounds of the education provision of the state constitution, the court reiterated
that the premise of the opinion was “that education is a basic, fundamental
constitutional right that is available to all children within this Common-
wealth.”152  Within a year of Rose, the Kentucky legislature enacted the Ken-
tucky Education Reform Act (KERA), a comprehensive package of education
reforms based on the seven enumerated goals.153  Over the next ten years, Ken-
tucky enjoyed improved student achievement and lasting education reform.154
Rose has served as a model that many states have sought to emulate.155
By providing the seven learning goals defining the contours of an adequate
education, the Rose court created a structure within which the state legislature
could work to achieve a constitutionally sufficient level of quality education.156
Additionally, the Rose court’s willingness to take control of education finance
and compel the legislature to design a new system has inspired bold action on
the part of the judiciary in other states to seek sweeping reform in their hold-
ings.157  Finally, the Kentucky model highlights the importance of courts and
legislatures working together to achieve education reform through litigation.158
2. McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education
Like the Kentucky model, Massachusetts’s education reform case rein-
forces the importance of collaboration between state courts and state legisla-
tures.159 In McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Education,160 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts first acknowledged that the suit was
an adequacy suit:161
We note that the plaintiffs do not seek a judgment that the Commonwealth has an
obligation to equalize educational spending across all towns and cities, or that the
Commonwealth has an obligation to provide equal educational opportunities to all its
students.  Instead, they seek a declaratory judgment that these constitutional provi-
sions require the State to provide every young person . . . with “adequate”
education.162
The court then devoted sixteen pages to reviewing the language, constitutional
structure, and history of education in Massachusetts, and concluded that a qual-
151 Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212.
152 Id. at 215.
153 Elder, supra note 66, at 774.
154 Id. at 775 (citing Molly A. Hunter, All Eyes Forward: Public Engagement and Educa-
tional Reform in Kentucky, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 485, 515-16 (1999)).
155 Palfrey, supra note 99, at 23.
156 Id. at 24.
157 Thro, Third Wave, supra note 71, at 604.
158 Palfrey, supra note 99, at 24.
159 Id. at 24-25.
160 McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993).
161 Thro, Third Wave, supra note 71, at 608.
162 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 522.
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ity standard of education did in fact exist under the Massachusetts
Constitution.163
The McDuffy court declared the state’s education system constitutionally
inadequate, and adopted word-for-word the seven learning goals from Rose.164
In addition, the McDuffy court reserved for the legislature the responsibility of
“defining the specifics and the appropriate means to provide the constitution-
ally-required education.”165  Three days later, the Massachusetts legislature
passed the Education Reform Act of 1993, restructuring the funding scheme of
public education and employing “objective and performance-based accounta-
bility measures for all children, teachers, schools and districts.”166
The Rose and McDuffy opinions are instructive, and can serve as models
for both education reform plaintiffs in Nevada as well as the judges that over-
see such cases.  For instance, in determining whether their state constitutions
mandated a particular level of adequacy in schooling, both courts examined a
variety of sources, including: the specific language of state constitutions’ edu-
cation clauses; the constitutional history surrounding the education clauses; the
history of education in the state; and whether education was considered a fun-
damental right under the state constitution.  Additionally, in determining
whether the current state of education was constitutionally deficient, the Rose
court looked to the national rankings across an assortment of categories used to
evaluate educational performance and found the Kentucky education system
lacking in virtually every respect.  Notably, Nevada today ranks lower nation-
ally than Kentucky circa 1989 in every education statistic examined in the Rose
decision.167  Finally, these model cases suggest that the best approach to
achieving true education reform out of school-finance litigation requires that
the judicial and legislative branches work together.
IV. CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEVADA SYSTEM OF
FUNDING PUBLIC EDUCATION
As seen in the model cases above, and in accordance with four decades of
education litigation in state courts across the country, a constitutional challenge
to Nevada’s education financing scheme should show that there exists both
statistical proof that Nevada is failing to provide its students with an adequate
education and a constitutional basis for declaring the school system inadequate.
This section presents the factual and legal bases for an adequacy suit in
Nevada, and concludes with a brief discussion on determining how, exactly, the
Nevada judiciary might come to define what constitutes an “adequate
education.”
A. The Factual Basis for Education Reform in Nevada
In order to ensure a “reasonably equal education opportunity” for each
Nevada child, regardless of the wealth of individual school districts, the 1967
163 Thro, Third Wave, supra note 71, at 610.
164 Elder, supra note 66, at 775.
165 McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554 n.92.
166 Elder, supra note 66, at 775.
167 See infra Part IV.A.
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legislature adopted the Nevada Plan as the mechanism to finance K-12 public
education.168  Each legislative session, the Nevada legislature establishes a
statewide aggregate K-12 budget that guarantees a level of funding on a per-
pupil basis.169  The funds, which come from both state and local sources, are
divided statewide by a weighted apportionment enrollment that adjusts funding
based on student grade-levels and student transfers into and out of the school
district.170  The Nevada Plan also levels disparities in inter-district funding
through weighted calculations based on the unique characteristics of each dis-
trict, such as student enrollment, transportation costs, local wealth factors, and
more.171  Thus, districts with higher local revenues and lower costs per student
receive less state aid than districts with lower local revenues and higher costs
per student.172  These adjustments establish a per-pupil funding amount for
each district, which the State guarantees to provide.173  On average, these guar-
anteed funds provide roughly 78 percent of school districts’ operating funds,174
with the remaining costs coming from local revenues “outside” the Nevada
Plan.175  As a result, the Nevada Plan has been characterized as a public
school-financing system that provides for great equity of educational
opportunity.176
Despite Nevada’s laudable achievements in creating equal educational
opportunities for its students, the issue of whether Nevada is providing its stu-
dents an adequate education is debatable.  In August of 2010, the University of
Nevada Las Vegas’ Lied Institute for Real Estate Studies brought together forty
Southern Nevadan professionals for a roundtable discussion, the topic of which
was “Nevada: 50th in the Nation for Education?”.177  The roundtable was in
response to concerns over the “education crisis in Nevada” and the resulting
inability to attract innovative employers to diversify the state’s depressed econ-
omy.178  With the roundtable in agreement that successful economic diversifi-
cation will require a greater investment in our public schools, the group
recommended a series of changes, including the need for a responsible and
serious conversation about tax reform and the need for education to become a
core value for all Nevadans.179  To this end, the roundtable issued a call to
action, requesting that local chambers of commerce advocate on behalf of the
168 NEV. REV. STAT. § 387.121 (2009).
169 FISCAL ANALYSIS DIV., LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, THE NEVADA PLAN FOR
SCHOOL FINANCE: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2011), available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/
Fiscal/NevadaPlan/Nevada_Plan_2011_JW.pdf.
170 Id.
171 JOHN AUGENBLICK ET AL., ESTIMATING THE COST OF AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION IN
NEVADA 91 (2006), available at http://www.apaconsulting.net/uploads/reports/5.pdf.
172 LAS VEGAS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EDUCATION BRIEFING SERIES: EDUCATION FUND-
ING IN NEVADA 6 (2010), available at http://www.lvchamber.com/files/pdf/lvcc-edbrief-
appendix-2-3.pdf.
173 Id.
174 FISCAL ANALYSIS DIV., supra note 169, at 2.
175 AUGENBLICK, supra note 171, at 92.
176 See, e.g., id. at 105; LAS VEGAS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 172, at 4.
177 LIED INST. FOR REAL ESTATE STUDIES, NEVADA: 50TH IN THE NATION FOR EDUCATION?
3 (2010), available at http://business.unlv.edu/files/lied/2010LiedWhitePaper.pdf.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 4.
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need for true education investments in Nevada to diversify its economy and
help prevent it from returning to a deep recession.180
The call was answered by the Las Vegas Chamber of Commerce, which,
throughout 2010, released a series of Education Analysis Reports to help deter-
mine where taxpayer dollars are currently being spent on education and to pro-
vide a factual foundation to make informed public policy recommendations.
To date, the chamber has issued three reports from its Education Briefing
Series. K-12 Student Achievement Testing, released in March 2010, provides
comparisons of student achievement amongst the states and found that Nevada
continues to rank well below the national average on standardized student pro-
ficiency exams administered to elementary, middle, and high school stu-
dents.181 Factors Correlated with Educational Attainment, released in April
2010, assesses the effects of various socio-economic factors and school opera-
tions on student achievement in Nevada.182  The third, and final, report,
released in December 2010, discusses education funding in Nevada, character-
izing the Nevada Plan as follows:
In summary, the Legislature’s application of the Nevada Plan for School Finance
forms a ceiling for total K-12 funding, and absorbs residual balances of K-12 revenue
for general purposes.  Virtually all authority over K-12 taxes, other than voter-
approved capital funds and related debt service rests with the Legislature.  Although
the Legislature funds schools in the aggregate, not by line item, its estimates are
sufficiently precise that little flexibility remains for local school boards.  The Legisla-
ture’s comprehensive ownership of K-12 operating revenue transfers significant tax
revenue among school districts in the name of equity, and to the exclusion of local
determination of funding levels.  Finally the state’s practice of returning excess K-12
appropriations to its general fund in years when revenues are ample, coupled with its
periodic lapses in meeting its funding pledge to school districts renders the state’s
“guarantee” a misnomer at best.183
The problems found within the current Nevada Plan, combined with inad-
equate funding levels, have led to rather abysmal and embarrassing education
statistics in comparison with the rest of the country.  Perhaps the most effective
means of organizing such statistics is to adopt the unfortunate Nevada rubric,
wherein the state finds itself at the bottom of every good list and the top of
every bad list.  At the bottom of every good list, Nevada currently ranks forty-
ninth in per-pupil expenditures and forty-fifth in spending on education as a
percent of state taxable resources.184  On standardized national exams, Nevada
fourth-graders rank forty-third in math and forty-fourth in reading.185  By grade
eight, Nevada students fall to forty-fourth in math and forty-eighth in read-
ing.186  At the top of the bad lists, Nevada enjoys the fourth-highest student-
180 Id.
181 LAS VEGAS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, EDUCATION BRIEFING SERIES: K-12 STUDENT
ACHIEVEMENT TESTING 2 (2010), available at http://www.lvchamber.com/files/pdf/chamber-
student-testing-narrative.pdf.
182 LAS VEGAS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 11, at 1.
183 LAS VEGAS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 172, at 12-13.
184 EDITORIAL PROJECTS IN EDUC. RESEARCH CTR., NEVADA—STATE HIGHLIGHTS 2010, at
14 (2010); see also LAS VEGAS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 11, at 20.
185 LAS VEGAS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 181, app. 3.
186 Id.
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teacher ratio in the country and the highest number of students per school.187
Rounding out these statistics, with fewer than 50 percent of the public high
school students graduating with a diploma, Nevada maintains the country’s
highest high school dropout rate.188
In January 2010, Editorial Projects in Education Research Center, the
independent non-profit publisher of Education Week, released its fourteenth
annual Quality Counts report card on public education in the fifty states and the
District of Columbia.189  For a second year, Nevada ranked fiftieth in the nation
for its quality of public K-12 education in the Quality Counts report.190  Per-
haps most alarming, however, is that the report ranks Nevada dead last amongst
the states in providing its schoolchildren opportunities for success, according to
the “Chance-for-Success Index.”191  The Chance-for-Success Index measures
each state’s capacity for helping its youth succeed by “combin[ing] information
from 13 indicators that span an individual’s life from cradle to career,” with a
heavy emphasis on the performance of public schools and the educational and
economic outcomes in adulthood.192
How has the legislature responded to these alarming statistics?  Less than
one month after the Quality Counts report was released in 2010, the 26th Spe-
cial Session of the Nevada legislature reduced supposedly “guaranteed” per-
student funding levels across the state.193  Such acts fly in the face of the legis-
lature’s constitutional duty to “encourage by all suitable means the promotion
of intellectual, literary, scientific . . . and moral improvements,”194 in providing
for education.  While the statistical evidence cries out for judicial review, there
remains the question of whether a constitutional basis exists to challenge the
currently inadequate state of education in Nevada.
B. The Legal Basis for Education Reform Litigation in Nevada
One can best determine whether a state constitution’s education provision
establishes education as a fundamental right or mandates a particular quality
standard by looking to the actual text of the provision itself.195  Article 11 of
the Nevada Constitution embodies the high value placed on education as
expressed by the state’s constitutional framers.  Of particular importance are
Sections 1, 2, and 6.  Section 1 mandates:
The legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual,
literary, scientific, mining, mechanical, agricultural, and moral improvements
. . . .
196
Section 2 mandates:
187 LAS VEGAS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 11, at 21-22.
188 Id. app. 1, at 4.
189 EDITORIAL PROJECTS IN EDUC. RESEARCH CTR., supra note 184, at 1.
190 Id. at 2.
191 Id. at 9.
192 Id. at 8.
193 CLARK CNTY. SCH. DIST., supra note 6, at 16.
194 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
195 Thro, A New Approach, supra note 72, at 537-38.
196 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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The legislature shall provide for a uniform system of common schools, by which a
school shall be established and maintained in each school district at least six months
in every year . . . and the legislature may pass such laws as will tend to secure a
general attendance of the children in each school district upon said public schools.197
And Section 6 requires the Nevada legislature to provide for the support and
maintenance of the public schools by funding their operation before funding
any other part of the state budget.198
In A New Approach to State Constitutional Analysis in School Finance
Litigation, Professor William E. Thro, building upon the works of Professors
Grubb and Ratner, established a tripartite classification scheme categorizing the
educational provisions of state constitutions based upon the duty they impose
upon their state legislatures.199  Thro argues that merely because an education
clause exists within a state constitution does not, by itself, demand a specific
level of adequate education or establish education as a fundamental right.200
Rather, each state constitution, with its own unique education clause,201
imposes a different level of duty on the state legislature.202  Each state’s consti-
tution obligates the legislature to establish some form of educational system,
yet each has its own unique phrasing.  In a search for consistency and predict-
ability in school finance litigation, many scholars have postulated a categorical
approach—grouping the education clauses of the states into categories based on
the duty the plain language imposes on the legislature.203
Thro’s first category of education clauses, the “establishment provisions,”
demands the least of the state legislature, simply requiring that it establish free
public education within the state and nothing more.204  The educational provi-
sions of seventeen state constitutions fall within this category.205  Because they
merely mandate the establishment of a system of education, the plain language
of these provisions fails to create either an adequacy standard or a fundamental
right in education.206  Alaska’s education clause is typical of such establish-
197 Id. § 2.
198 This is a recent (2006) addition to the Nevada Constitution by voter initiative following
the Guinn decision. See infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text.
199 Thro, A New Approach, supra note 72, at 553 n.34.
200 Thro, Third Wave, supra note 71, at 605.
201 But see Avidan Y. Cover, Is “Adequacy” a More “Political Question” than “Equal-
ity?”: The Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education
Finance, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 404 & n.6 (2002) (noting that scholars disa-
gree whether Mississippi has an education clause).
202 Thro, A New Approach, supra note 72, at 538-39.
203 See, e.g., Erica Black Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right to Bilingual
Education, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 66-70 (1974); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal
Duty For Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777,
814-16, n.143-46 (1985); Thro, The Role of Language, supra note 98, at 19-31.
204 Thro, A New Approach, supra note 72, at 539.
205 See ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1; CONN. CONST. art. 8, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. X, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 1; LA. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 1; N.M. CONST. art.
XII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2; OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1;
S.C. CONST. art. XI, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; UTAH CONST. art. X, § 1; VT. CONST.
ch. II, § 68.
206 Thro, A New Approach, supra note 72, at 542-43.
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ment provisions, providing: “The legislature shall by general law establish and
maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the State . . . .”207
The intermediate category, referred to as “quality provisions,” requires
that a certain level of quality within the educational system be provided by the
state legislature.208  Eighteen state constitutions209 have these “quality provi-
sions,” which typically demand that the system of public education established
within the state be of a “thorough and/or efficient” quality.210  In other words,
for a system of education to be constitutionally adequate, the legislature must
go beyond simply establishing an educational system and provide a certain
level of constitutionally mandated quality.  An example of quality provisions
can be found in West Virginia’s constitution, which provides: “The Legislature
shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of free
schools.”211
Finally, there are fourteen state constitutions212 with educational provi-
sions that fall within the third category, labeled “high duty provisions.”  These
provisions elevate education above other governmental functions.  These high
duty provisions typically make education a “paramount”213 or “primary”214
duty of the legislature, and go beyond the establishment and quality provisions
of other states with stronger and more specific educational mandates, such as
“all means.”215  Thro argues that these high duty provisions elevate education
to a level of such import that “it is logical to say it is a fundamental right.”216
207 ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1.
208 Thro, A New Approach, supra note 72, at 539.
209 See ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2; DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. IX, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; KY. CONST. § 183; MD. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1; MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV;
N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; PA. CONST.
art. III, § 14, TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1; VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XII,
§ 1; WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3.
210 Thro, A New Approach, supra note 72, at 539 n.38.
211 W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
212 See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § I, para. I; ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1;
IND. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d, § 3; ME. CONST. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1;
MICH. CONST. ch.1, art. VIII, § 2; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a); NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 1; N.H.
CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII; R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH.
CONST. art. IX, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
213 See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“It is the paramount duty of the state to make
ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinc-
tion or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.”).
214 See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. I (“The provision of an adequate public educa-
tion for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia.”).
215 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence
being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature
shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and
agricultural improvement.”); see also NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, literary, scientific, mining,
mechanical, agricultural, and moral improvements, and also provide for a superintendent of
public instruction and by law prescribe the manner of appointment, term of office and the
duties thereof.”).
216 Thro, A New Approach, supra note 72, at 543.
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As such, these high duty provisions legitimize both adequacy suits, by creating
a quality standard, and equality suits, by establishing a fundamental right.217
The education provision of Nevada’s Constitution falls under the “high
duty” provision within this analytical framework.218  By requiring the legisla-
ture to promote education “by all suitable means,”219 the Nevada Constitution
has created both a stronger and more specific educational mandate to promote
education than seen in most other state constitutions.  Such a mandate indicates
that, in comparison to other states, the Nevada Constitution requires a certain
baseline of quality education, and arguably establishes education as a funda-
mental right within the state.  The California Supreme Court’s holding in Ser-
rano220 that education is a fundamental right under its state constitution further
validates the notion of a fundamental right to education in Nevada, because
Nevada’s educational constitutional provision is modeled after California’s.
Beyond a comparative analysis of state education clauses, a historical
review of Nevada’s Constitutional Convention indicates the framers strongly
believed education to be a basic, if not fundamental, right that demands a cer-
tain level of quality.  During the Nevada State Constitutional Convention of
1864, the framers spent considerable time debating the role education should
play in the future of the state.221  Indeed, the debate over whether attendance in
public schools should be compulsory pitted the values of education against the
private right of a parent to dictate his or her child’s education, and led to some
of the more profound statements of the framers’ view of the role education
would play in the new state’s constitution.222  Those opposed to compulsory
attendance viewed such a mandate as dictatorial and undemocratic, striking at
the very “spirit of our institutions when we are seeking to compel our fellow-
citizens to send their children to the public schools.”223  Proponents of the com-
pulsory language argued that our democratic form of government presupposes
an educated citizenry and therefore:
[C]hildren of the State, growing up to be men and women, should have the privilege
secured to them of attending school . . . .  We have no right, and we cannot afford to
allow children to grow up in ignorance.  The public is interested in that matter, and it
is one of too great importance to be neglected.224
In the end, Section 2’s granting of legislative power to “pass such laws as
will tend to secure a general attendance of the children in each school district”
was the resulting compromise between two important—indeed, fundamental—
values: education and the private rights of citizens.225  This compromise sup-
ports the notion that education, in the framers’ minds, is a fundamental right of
217 Id. at 544.
218 Id. at 540 n.39.
219 NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
220 See supra Part III.A.
221 See OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CON-
VENTION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 565-82, 585-94, 659-62 (1866) [hereinafter NEVADA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION].
222 BUSHNELL & DRIGGS, supra note 125, at 32.
223 See NEVADA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 221, at 571 (statement of Mr.
Warwick).
224 See id. at 567 (statement of John A. Collins of Storey County).
225 BUSHNELL & DRIGGS, supra note 125, at 32 (quotation omitted).
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every child and should be provided at an adequate enough level to fulfill its role
as an underpinning of our democratic society.  As Albert T. Hawley, delegate
of Douglas County, remarked at the close of debate on Section 2: “What we
want is a basis upon which to build the educational superstructure, by means of
which we can afford every child a sufficient amount of instruction to enable it
to go creditably through life.”226
Finally, although Nevada remains one of the few states yet to face educa-
tion-finance litigation, the Nevada Supreme Court has nonetheless recognized
the constitutional import of education in its opinion in Guinn v. Legislature.227
In 2003, during a legislative impasse over school funding, then-governor
Kenny Guinn initiated litigation requesting the Nevada Supreme Court to order
the state legislature to override a two-thirds super majority vote requirement
and appropriate funding for the 2003-05 school years.228  Though Guinn was,
and remains, a controversial case,229 the court’s analysis of the framers’ stance
on education remains uncontroversial.  Citing to the Debates & Proceedings of
the Nevada State Constitutional Convention of 1864, the court stated: “Our
Constitution’s framers strongly believed that each child should have the oppor-
tunity to receive a basic education.  Their views resulted in a Constitution that
places great importance on education.  Its provisions demonstrate that educa-
tion is a basic constitutional right in Nevada.”230  The court concluded, “The
framers have elevated the public education of the youth of Nevada to a position
of constitutional primacy.  Public education is a right that the people, and the
youth, of Nevada are entitled, through the Constitution, to access.”231  Notably,
following the Guinn decision, Nevada voters approved the Education First ini-
tiative, amending the state constitution to require the Nevada legislature to fund
public education before appropriating any other government expenditures.232
Thus, along with the framers and the Nevada Supreme Court, the Nevada elec-
torate has also intimated at the primacy of education over all other state-pro-
vided services.
C. Determining the Content of the Right to Adequate Education in Nevada
When a court finds the state’s school system constitutionally inadequate,
the subsequent step of articulating a suitable remedy to correct these educa-
tional inadequacies often proves quite difficult.233  What, after all, is an “ade-
quate education”?  Beginning with the premise that constitutional construction
226 See NEVADA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, supra note 221, at 577 (statement of Mr.
Hawley) (emphasis added).
227 Guinn v. Legislature, 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003).
228 Id. at 1272.
229 For a more in-depth understanding of the Guinn controversy, see Symposium: Guinn v.
Legislature of Nevada, 4 NEV. L.J. 491 (2004).
230 Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1275.
231 Id. at 1276.
232 Editorial, Education First? Oh My!, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Nov. 30, 2006, at 8B, available
at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2006/Nov-30-Thu-2006/opinion/11130187.
html.
233 Palfrey, supra note 99, at 3.
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is purely a province of the judiciary,234 defining the content of the right to
education under the Nevada Constitution will be a task for the Nevada judiciary
to fulfill.  However, because Nevada is late to the game of education-finance-
reform litigation, the jurisprudential endeavors of our sister states should prove
valuable in moving forward.  While this Note does not delve into a detailed
analysis of high court rulings defining the content of “quality” education
beyond those presented in Part II.B, a brief overview of academic analyses of
past high court rulings and a suggested approach in defining “adequacy” are
presented below.
Perhaps the greatest fear and criticism presented in this endeavor to judi-
cially define and enforce an adequate education, is the potential for legislative
evasion.235  Thus, based on past litigation, scholars have advocated for reme-
dies in which the judiciary (1) takes a firm but limited role to protect the consti-
tutional rights of schoolchildren; (2) defines adequacy specifically enough to
minimize inter-branch tensions and provide political cover for legislatures who
must implement the reform; and (3) engages in a collaborative dialogue with
the legislative and executive branches, as well as local school boards, parents,
unions, and other affected or interested parties.236
Fortunately, the Nevada legislature began such a dialogue in 2005 when
the Nevada’s Legislative Committee on School Financing Adequacy commis-
sioned a report on estimating the costs of an adequate education in Nevada.237
The Committee selected Augenblick, Palaich and Associates (APA), a Denver-
based consulting firm that worked with state policy makers on school funding
issues for more than twenty years, to produce the 131-page report, which was
released to the legislature in August 2006.238  For the purpose of the report,
APA adopted a definition of adequacy as “the cost of meeting state and federal
resource requirement and student performance expectations, including those in
Nevada’s education accountability system and the state’s federally-approved
plan to comply with the No Child Left Behind Act.”239  APA combined several
analytical approaches to determine the costs necessary to provide for an ade-
quate education in Nevada, and provided funding goals to achieve adequacy as
well as minor policy tweaks to the current Nevada system of funding
education.240
The APA report is certainly not the only route the judiciary may follow,
but it serves as a suitable starting point for a dialogue between the judiciary and
the legislature in defining the right to education.  Such collaborations are neces-
sary to the success of judicial remedies fraught with inter-branch tension.
234 Guinn, 71 P.3d at 1274 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803);
State v. Rosenthal, 559 P.2d 830, 834 (Nev. 1977)).
235 See Koski, supra note 72, at 1185.
236 Palfrey, supra note 99, at 4.
237 AUGENBLICK, supra note 171, at 1.
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 See id. at 2.
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V. ADDRESSING CRITICISMS—IS THIS THE COURT’S JOB?
Opponents of education reform lawsuits often claim that courts overstep
their constitutional boundaries when they play a role in school finance.241
Where state courts rule that schools are constitutionally inadequate, charges of
“judicial activism” and “legislating from the bench” are sure to follow.242
Although such criticisms express legitimate legal concerns, they are, at their
heart, unfounded.  The rationales behind separation of powers concerns and the
political question doctrine, although common to federal court adjudication, do
not apply in the same manner to state courts.243  It is within these fundamental
differences between state and federal courts, governments, and constitutions
that exists the rationale for state court authority to adjudicate and enforce con-
stitutional remedies in school finance litigation against a stagnant legislature.244
First, on the constitutional level, the U.S. Constitution is substantively dif-
ferent from state constitutions.  The U.S. Constitution is a charter of negative
rights that block the government from taking action that would infringe on a
person’s right.245  State constitutions, on the contrary, include positive rights—
such as a right to education—that entitle people to a benefit or action from the
state government.246  When a constitution mandates a positive right, the legisla-
tive and executive branches are compelled to carry out that constitutional
goal.247  Accordingly, it logically follows that it is the state judiciary’s role to
ensure that the state legislature complies with its constitutional duty to provide
this positive right.248  Therefore, the enforcement of positive rights, such as the
right to education, requires that the state court share in the public governing
function of the other two branches.249  Because the education provisions of the
Nevada Constitution place a duty on the legislature to provide an adequate edu-
cation,250 a finding for the plaintiffs in school finance litigation would not be
the result of an activist court, but rather the responsible enforcement of a con-
stitutional covenant between the government and its people.
Second, whereas Article III judges receive lifetime appointments, the
majority of state court judges are subject to judicial election.251  Thus, in the
federal court system, where a judge is appointed for a life term, it is reasonable
to provide safeguards against the loss of democratic control by preventing the
241 See, e.g., Patrick R. Gibbons, Inadequate? Or Ineffective?, NEV. POL’Y RES. INST. (Sept.
30, 2009), http://www.npri.org/publications/inadequate-or-ineffective (“Though courts in
nine states have refused to hear adequacy lawsuits, some courts have overstepped their con-
stitutional roles and interpreted these [education clauses] to require increases in educational
expenditures.”).
242 See Know the Issues: The Role of the Courts, NAT’L ACCESS NETWORK, http://www.
schoolfunding.info/issues/handouts/roleofthecourts.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
243 Elder, supra note 66, at 759-60.
244 See O’Neill, supra note 17, at 577-58.
245 Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Ration-
ality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1137-38 (1999).
246 Elder, supra note 66, at 760-61.
247 Hershkoff, supra note 245, at 1138.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See supra Part IV.B.
251 Elder, supra note 66, at 763.
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judge from engaging in policymaking that is the responsibility of the legisla-
ture.252  However, where a judge is subject to popular review, the rationale
behind concerns of judicial activism based on lifetime appointments melts
away.253  In Nevada, state judges in both the supreme court and district courts
are subject to a nonpartisan election every six years.254
Third, the state judiciary is a more competent policymaker than the federal
judiciary in local matters under the state’s jurisdiction.  A constant concern
regarding Article III courts injecting themselves into local public policy matters
is a certain incompetence of federal courts in local dealings.255  As the United
States Supreme Court stated in Rodriguez: “[W]e stand on familiar ground
when we continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of
wise decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public reve-
nues.”256  However, this argument loses strength against state courts with
closer ties to the community and a much smaller jurisdiction.257
Furthermore, state courts may often be as institutionally competent as, if
not more than, the state legislature in matters of social welfare.258  Professor
Hershoff points out that most state constitutions “do not reflect the same level
of trust in state legislative decisionmaking as does the federal Constitution in
congressional decisionmaking.”259  A source of this distrust lies in the fact that
many state legislatures are underpaid, understaffed, and part-time.260  Nevada
remains one of seventeen states with a part-time legislature,261 and the Nevada
legislature only meets biennially.262  The part-time nature of the elected posi-
tion requires that state legislators have other—potentially conflicting—means
of earning income.  Furthermore, the lack of time, staff, and other valuable
resources might compromise the legislature’s ability to create meaningful legis-
lation when it comes to something as important, complex, and pervasive as
education.
VI. CONCLUSION
After the last ten years of budget cuts and the elimination of innovative
education programs, and in light of reports—both local and national—decrying
the troubling state of education in Nevada, there is clearly no time better than
the present to challenge the legislature’s maintenance of the state school system
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See NEV. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 5.
255 See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973) (“We are
unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior to that of legislators, scholars,
and educational authorities in 50 States . . . .”).
256 Id. at 41.
257 Elder, supra note 66, at 764.
258 O’Neill, supra note 17, at 582.
259 Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Func-
tion, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1892-93 (2001).
260 Id. at 1892.
261 Full and Part-Time Legislatures, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
?tabid=16701 (last updated June 2009).
262 NEV. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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as unconstitutionally inadequate.  So long as Nevada remains “at the bottom of
every good list and the top of every bad list,” the promise of education in the
Nevada Constitution remains unfulfilled.
Nevada is one of five states that has not yet ruled on the constitutionality
of its public education financing system.  Both education reform plaintiffs in
Nevada and the Nevada judiciary should take advantage of the fact that forty-
five states have gone down this path before.  As the model cases of such reform
show,263 successful litigation demands that the two branches—judicial and leg-
islative—work together.  Through an adequacy challenge, the court can issue
specific guidelines directing the legislature toward the constitutionally required
levels of adequate education.  The legislature can then enact specific legislation
to ensure a constitutionally adequate education system.  A holding by the
Nevada Supreme Court declaring the legislative branch to be in direct violation
of its constitutional duty to provide an adequate education to the children of
Nevada could realistically prompt much needed education reform within the
state.  As it stands, there exists both a statistical and constitution basis for such
a holding.
263 See supra Part II.
